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The Role of the Board of Directors:
The ALI and Its Critics*
VICTOR BRUDNEY**

I.

LOOKING BACKWARD

In 1911, Mr. Justice Neville, in the English Chancery Division,
described the board of directors of a corporation in the case before
him:'
The directors of the company, Sir Arthur Aylmer, Bart.,
Henry William Tugwell, Edward Barber, and Edward Henry
Hancock, were all induced to become directors by Harbord or
persons acting with him in the promotion of the company. Sir
Arthur Aylmer was absolutely ignorant of business. He only consented to act because he was told the office would give him a
little pleasant employment without his incurring any responsibility. H. W. Tugwell was partner in a firm of bankers in a good
position in Bath; he was seventy-five years of age and very deaf
....

Barber was a rubber broker and was told that all he would

have to do would be to give an opinion as to the value of rubber
when it arrived in England. Hancock was a man of business who
said he was induced to join by seeing the names of Tugwell and
Barber, whom he considered good men.'
These men were held not liable for losses sustained in a disastrous speculation in rubber plantations in Brazil. They had failed
to make any inquiry into the truth of representations on which
they relied in authorizing the corporation to buy the plantations,
despite more or less explicit warnings to them of the falsehood of
material parts of those representations. In Justice Neville's view:
[A director] is, I think, not bound to bring any special qualifications to his office. He may undertake the management of a rubber company in complete ignorance of everything connected
with rubber, without incurring responsibility for the mistakes
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which may result from such ignorance . . . . He is not ...
bound to take any definite part in the conduct of the company's
business, but so far as he does undertake it he must use reasonable care . .. .3
American law today, although it requires no special competence of
directors,4 typically purports to demand more from them. The
statutes often require "[aill corporate powers [to] be exercised by
or under authority of, and the business and affairs of a corporation
[to] be managed under the direction of, a board of directors."5
Supplemented by case law, the statutes impose, to some indeterminate extent, obligations on directors to keep an eye on management's performance and to exercise their functions with prudence.
It is fair to say that, at least until recently, those legal admonitions were reflected in the public statements of the organized establishments of both the business6 and legal communities. 7 The
business establishment stressed the positive functions of directors
more than did the legal establishment, but both recognized that it
was an important function of directors to oversee and assess the
conduct of corporate managers in pursuing lawful wealth-maximizing activities on behalf of stockholders. Both acknowledged that
management's minimum obligations of care in pursuing wealth for
stockholders were complemented by directors' duties of care in selecting and replacing management, in approving major plans or
commitments, and in overseeing and assessing management's performance. Also, the organized business community appeared to believe that corporate structure should be molded to facilitate such
performance by constituting the board principally of outside directors, with certain committees (particularly audit committees) similarly constituted. Indeed such a board was repeatedly urged in the
business literature of the 1970's as a shield to legitimate the power
of management of large American corporations and to avoid gov3. Id. at 437.
4. The requirement that proxy statements contain biographical information about directorial candidates, however, reflects the notion that stockholders should have an opportunity to assess, inter alia, the candidates' competence.
5. E.g., MODEL BUSINESS CoaRP. ACT § 35 (1979); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a)

(1983).
6. See The Business Roundtable, The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors
of the Large Publicly Owned Corporation,33 Bus. LAW. 2083, 2093-102 (1978).
7. See Committee on Corporate Laws, ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1591, 1606-11 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Corporate Director's Guidebook].
8. See The Business Roundtable, supra note 6.
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ernment regulation of the enterprises.
The critical, even hysterical, reactions of many business executives and their lawyers 9 to the American Law Institute ("ALI") Reporters' quite faithful interpretation' 0 of current law on the duty of
care and their adoption of those structural principles is therefore
somewhat puzzling.'" It is all the more puzzling because of the contradictory tones of the critics. Some of the criticism is addressed to
a perceived greater exposure of directors to liability; it appears to
fear that this will cause too much directorial intrusion into areas of
managerial discretion, and suggests a preference for the music if
not the words of Justice Neville. Other criticism suggests a potentially heroic role for directors and complains that the Reporters'
proposals would thwart that role.
The core of the Reporters' proposals-the definition of the
functions of directors12 and the delineation of officers' and directors' duties of care'" and of the scope of business judgment
rule 4 -is largely a description of existing legal doctrine. If it is
possible to quarrel with particular phrases,' 5 the quarrels are
9. See, e.g., Lewin, The Corporate-Reform Furor,N.Y. Times, June 10, 1982, at D1, col.
3; Letter from Chairman of the Business Roundtable's Corporate Responsibility Task Force
to the Business Roundtable, reprintedin DIRECTOR'S MONTHLY, Dec. 1982, at 5 [hereinafter
cited as Business Roundtable Letter].
10. PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDA(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].

TIONS

11. The ALI Reporters' proposals on functions and duties of the board do not differ
materially, if at all, from the views set out in the Corporate Director'sGuidebook. Compare
RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, §§ 3.02, 4.01 with CorporateDirector'sGuidebook, supra note
7, at 1600-04, 1606-11. The board functions recommended by the ALI Reporters in § 3.02(a)
are strikingly similar to those recommended in the Final Report of the 54th American Assembly held at Arden House, Harriman, N.Y., on April 13-16, 1978. See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AMERICA (54th American Assembly 1978); see also Committee on Corporate Laws,
ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, The Overview Committees of the
Board of Directors, 34 Bus. LAW. 1837 (1979).
12. RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 3.02.
13. Id. § 4.01.
14. Id. § 4.01(d).
15. One complaint focuses upon the requirement that a business decision must have "a
rational basis" in order to come within the protection of the business judgment rule. Id. §
4.01(d)(3). Current law is authoritatively said to impose a similar requirement. See, e.g.,
Arsht, FiduciaryResponsibilities of Directors, Officers and Key Employees, 4 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 652, 660-63 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Arsht, FiduciaryResponsibilities]; Arsht & Hinsey, Codified Standard-Same Harbor But Charted Channel: A Response, 35 Bus. LAW.
947, 958 (1980); Caplin, Outside Directors and their Responsibilities: A Program for the
Exercise of Due Care, 1 J. CORP. L. 57, 59 (1975); Veasey & Manning, Codified Standard-Safe Harbor or Uncharted Reef? An Analysis of the Model Act Standard of Care
Compared with Delaware Law, 35 Bus. LAW. 919, 930-42 (1980). Section 35 of the Model
Business Corporation Act also requires a rational basis. See Arsht, FiduciaryResponsibilities, supra, at 662; Arsht & Hinsey, supra, at 958; Veasey & Manning, supra, at 930-42; cf.
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largely formal.' 6 The aridity of those quarrels is emphasized if we
Committee on Corporate Laws, ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law,
Changes in the Model Business CorporationAct-Amendments to Financial Provisions,34
Bus. LAW. 1867, 1882 (1979) (stating that the business judgment rule applying to directors'
decisions to authorize shareholder distributions, pursuant to § 45 of the 1979 amended version of the Model Act, requires directors to have acted with a reasonable basis for believing
that § 45 permitted the distribution) [hereinafter cited as Committee on Corporate Laws,
Changes in the MBCAJ. The requirement of a "rational basis" has also been viewed as
imposing a lesser burden than other formulations of the business judgment rule. See generally Haft, Business Decisions by the New Board: Behavioral Science and Corporate Law,
80 MICH. L. REV. 1, 14-16 (1981) (discussing standards of liability). The disingenuousness of
some of the critics of the rational basis requirement is reflected in the complaint of an inhouse counsel that "'I don't know what "rational basis" is.'" Lewin, supra note 9, at D6,
col. 6.
16. The functions of directors delineated in § 3.02 of the ALI proposals conform to
functions theretofore asserted and proclaimed by business leaders. See, e.g., Blough, The
Outside Director at Work on the Board, 28 REc. A.B. CITY N.Y. 202 (1973); Conard, Mace,
Blough & Gibson, Functions of Directors under the Existing System, Bus. LAW., Special
Issue Feb. 1972, at 23, 39 (statement of Roger M. Blough). Initially, the ALI Reporters
considered prohibiting the board of directors from "managing" in certain circumstances. See
RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 3.02(b)(4). In practical terms, this prohibition would have
been quite harmless, if only because it is unlikely that boards of publicly held corporations
would have tried to "manage." The Reporters have withdrawn from this position. See R.
Perkins, Background and Status of ALI Corporate Governance Project and Commentary on
Papers of Professors Andrews, Demsetz and MacAvoy (Exhibits A, B and C. to Feb. 1983
Statement of the Business Roundtable) 15 (remarks at forum at the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York, Mar. 14, 1983).
That the import of the statement of the duty of care in the performance of those functions does not differ from the current law is suggested by a comparison of § 4.01 of the ALI
proposal with provisions in the Model Act and the New York corporation statute. Compare
RESTATEMENT, supra, § 4.01 with MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 35 (1979) and N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 717 (McKinney Supp. 1982); see also Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes
in the MBCA, supra note 15, at 1884; Discussion of Principlesof Corporate Governance
and Structure: Restatement and Recommendations, Tentative Draft No. 1, 59 A.L.I. PROC.
406, 498-500 (statement of Professor Harvey J. Goldschmid), 527-28 (statement of Elliot
Goldstein) (1982) [hereinafter cited as Discussion of Restatement]. To be sure, the ALI
adds the requirement that a director or officer should make reasonable inquiry when acting
upon corporate transactions or otherwise performing his functions. See RESTATEMENT,
supra, § 4.01(b). Although that requirement is explicit in the statutory law of only one state,
CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(a) (West 1977), there is no doubt, as the Committee on Corporate
Laws recently suggested in modifying another provision of the Model Act, that directors'
judgments are expected to be "informed." See Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in
the MBCA, supra, at 1882, 1884; see also Arsht, FiduciaryResponsibilities, supra note 15,
at 660; CorporateDirector's Guidebook, supra note 7, at 1602; Discussion of Restatement,
supra, at 498-500 (statement of Goldschmid), 527-28 (statement of Goldstein); see also
Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). Indeed, few would doubt that, under
the case law of every state, if a court could ever be persuaded that in fact the board failed to
make reasonable inquiry in a matter on which it acted or should have acted, the court would
hold that the board violated its duty of care.
Of larger import is the requirement that directors be reasonably concerned with the
existence and effectiveness of monitoring programs, including law compliance programs. See
RESTATEMENT, supra, § 4.01(b). To be "reasonably concerned" with a monitoring program
leaves ample room for variations, depending upon the size, structure, and business of any
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accept the thesis long ago put forward by Professor Bishop and not
since contradicted. 7 He pointed out that notwithstanding the estimable terms in which governing legal doctrine defines standards of
required conduct by management, and by directors in the matter
of overseeing managerial efficiency or performance, the law in operation has almost never found directors or management of nonfinancial corporations to be liable for violating those standards. And
in the case of financial corporations, directorial liability for lack of
care is generally not found unless the management to be policed
has been improperly diverting assets to itself. It is difficult to take
seriously, therefore, the complaints that, by stating no less ambiguously the ambiguities of the common law, the ALI would burden
directors and management with a heavier duty of care, or would
provide them with a less protective business judgment rule, than
does present law. The ALI proposals leave the same play in the
joints as does the law they restate. Directors and officers need feel
no more constrained in the one case than in the other.
Possibly the objections are addressed to the articulation of
propositions that are only implicit in the courts' opinions. Explicit
statement of the propositions in a text may give executives (and
some lawyers) a sense of more definite restriction, or more specific
command, in limiting discretionary behavior. 8 Possibly the chief
executive officers or directors never realized that the law embodied
those obligations-however porous-when the obligations were to
be sought in the thickets of case law or even when they were contained in the statute books. Or possibly, as the Chief Reporter for
particular corporation and upon any demonstrated need for such a program in view of past
history, present personnel, and the program's cost. Again, notwithstanding the language in
the Allis-Chalmers decision, Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 85, 188
A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963); see also Bates v. Dresser, 251 U.S. 524 (1920), there is little
reason to believe that under current law in Delaware or elsewhere, any set of facts that
would induce a court to find a failure by the board to be reasonably concerned with such
programs would not equally produce a judicial decision that the board had violated its common law duty of care. Cf. Small, The Evolving Role of the Director in Corporate Governance, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1353, 1360 n.35 (1979).
If there is room for debate over whether the requirement of reasonable concern for a
monitoring program effects some shift in emphasis in the prevailing law, no change at all is
imported into existing law by requiring explicitly that officers and directors make reasonable
efforts to cause their corporation to obey the law. See RESTATEMENT, supra, § 4.01(c); see
also infra text accompanying notes 54-64.
17. Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of
Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078 (1968).
18. Articulating the provisions gives them publicity and may bring to the forefront of
consciousness possibilities that are kept in the background of the mind when they are not
expressly set forth.
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the ALI put it, some of the critics prefer the law "to remain murky
and nebulous because . . .they can get away with a lot more. ' 19
With respect to broader objections to the ALI Reporters' recommendations, including their structural proposals for a majority
of outside directors, and audit, compensation, and nominating
committees similarly composed, still other motivation is possible.
In January 1982, the Chairman of the Business Roundtable Task
Force on Corporate Responsibility wrote a curious letter to the
members of the Roundtable.2 He urged them to oppose the ALI's
adoption of the reported proposals, including previously widely
publicized Roundtable recommendations for the composition and
structure of boards. In the course of the letter he asserted that the
ALI "project had its roots in the '70s as part of the effort to meet
federal incorporation and similar proposals."'2 ' And he went on to
suggest that "[i]f the effort to adopt that kind of legislation was
unsuccessful in the halcyon days of the activists, it is difficult to
regard that concern as having much validity now or, for that matter, in the foreseeable future." 2
In short, the ALI project was no longer a useful foil to the
efforts by "activists" to effect "reforms." Since the Business
Roundtable's proposals for corporate governance had roots similar
to those attributed to the ALI project, perhaps they also are now
no longer needed. Or maybe they should simply be put in the
closet, to be taken out and used if, despite the leadership of corporate business by the Roundtable's members, we again encounter
"the halcyon days of the activists."
Whatever the motives for the objections to the ALI structural
proposals, plainly a sensitive nerve is touched by the notion of
combining a requirement of outside directors and a structure of
special committees, with a reminder that directors have a supervising or assessing role2 to perform and are not just friendly advisers
19. Discussion of Restatement, supra note 16, at 457-58 (statement of Professor Stanley A. Kaplan).
20. Business Roundtable Letter, supra note 9.
21. Id. at 5.
22. Id.
23. The rationale of the objections to the ALI proposals is somewhat strained. The articulated point is that the proposals would rigidify, or at least deny necessary flexibility to,
corporate structure. In theory, what constitutes a productive structure for some, or even
most, corporations could be a counterproductive structure for others; therefore, the law
should not require a single structure for all companies. But law formulated according to that
theory effectively strikes at minimum standards.
It is true that the ALT Reporters' structural proposals would mandate what the Roundtable recommended as appropriate but not universally required. But boards structured ac-
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to management.

II.

SHOULD DIRECTORS HAVE OBLIGATIONS-OR SHOULD THEY

SERVE STOCKHOLDERS ONLY BY BEING CREATIVE PARTICIPANTS
WITH MANAGEMENT?

The reactions provoked by touching that nerve are sometimes
strident 4 and, as noted earlier, sometimes contradictory. But almost all the criticisms 2 5 appear to seek one result-reduction, if
not elimination, of the board's responsibility for monitoring management's performance; and some seek a return to the legal world
of Justice Neville and William McKinley.2
cording to those proposals are "already almost the fact." Andrews, Rigid Rules Will Not
Make Good Boards, HARv. Bus. REv., Nov.-Dec. 1982, at 34, 36. Boards with a majority of
outside directors compose at least 80% of the boards of large publicly held corporations. See
RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 3.03 comment a, at 72 (citing various surveys). There are
audit committees in almost 100% of those corporations. See id. § 3.05 comment a, at 85-86
(citing various studies). And the New York Stock Exchange conditions listing on the existence of audit committees comprised solely of independent directors. NEW YORK STOCK ExCHANGE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303.00 (1983). The existence of these boards and committees thus erodes most objections based on the claimed inflexibility of requiring them.
The case is no better for that objection to be ALI Reporters' weaker proposal for compensation committees. See RESTATEMENT, supra, § 3.07(a) (directors on the compensation committee of large publicly held corporations may not be officers or other employees of the
corporation, and a majority may not have significant relationships with the corporation's
senior executives). The case for novelty is somewhat more substantial with regard to the
ALI proposal for nominating committees, which would apply the outside-director requirement to all publicly held corporations, regardless of size. Id. § 3.06(a)(1).
It is true also that the ALI's prescription of committee function and structure is detailed-perhaps too detailed. See id. §§ 3.05(a)(2) (audit committee), 3.06(a)(2) (nominating
committee), 3.07(b)-(c) (compensation committee). But for the most part, the terms of the
proposals are flexible enough to meet all business requirements of large publicly held corporations-other than the requirement that their managements be free from accountability
and allowed effectively to perpetuate themselves and pick their successors. The obvious ease
(i.e., modest cost) with which such corporations can meet the structural requirements proposed by the ALI raises the question whether the objection based on inflexibility is not
really an objection to the merits, i.e., to the desirability of having so large a bevy of outside
directors looking over the shoulders of management.
24. See authorities cited supra note 9.
25. Objections addressed to the perceived increase in exposure to liability of directors
who fail to monitor adequately are made in support of both (a) the claim that the ALI
proposals would hamper performance by directors of a broad, constructive role and (b) the
claim that the proposals would press directors to intrude counterproductively into areas of
managerial discretion.
26. Some of the critics appear to fault the Reporters for not adopting a mode of statement that is currently fashionable among those who seek the form, but not the substance, of
restraints on insider conduct that are designed to protect public investors. The suggestion is
to retain the common law's vague and general prohibitions and to couple them with specific
statutory provisions offering safe havens for corporate insiders. The result would be not to
enhance, or even preserve, substantive protections for investors, but to assure insiders im-
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The objection of largest import is the claim that assigning a
monitoring function impedes, or indeed precludes, the evolving
new role of the board as a constructive participant with management. Professor Andrews suggests that one hope for improvement
of performance by American corporations lies in the productive interaction of the board and management, an interaction that he sees
developing in many boardrooms.2 7 He points out that the board is,

or should be, an institution composed of people who have affirmative roles to play in a creative partnership with management to
enhance the firm's productivity and profitability. Possibly, as he
suggests, requiring monitoring and sanctions is counterproductive
to the efforts of a board seeking to combine creative and control
functions.
Possibly, as he also suggested at the May 1982 ALI meeting,28
it is even "insulting" because it assumes that boards and managements may be doing less than their best for stockholders. Professor
Andrews is familiar with the performance and aspirations of board
members, and he may be right about most.2s But it does not follow
munity for certain behavior. And, by implication, the process would permit behavior that
the law might have prohibited before the safe harbors were made available. This kind of
"regulatory" approach is strange enough when adopted by the Securities and Exchange
Commission under administrations dedicated to saving costs by curtailing the protection
that the law offers to investors. But if a political agency like the SEC may (correctly or
incorrectly) see the election returns as charging it to move from a regulatory approach to a
facilitating approach, one wonders to what pressures it is appropriate for the ALI to yield in
balancing investor protection and managerial independence.
27. Andrews, supra note 23, at 39-40; cf. Haft, supra note 15, passim (advocating a
peer-group role for the board in its relationship with management).
28. Discussion of Restatement, supra note 16, at 446.
29. Unfortunately, Professor Andrews is not as familiar with the law of derivative suits.
The ALI proposal is complex, and in some respects it more significantly obstructs plaintiffs'
opportunities to hold management accountable than did the law of a decade ago, or even the
law of last year. To suggest that the proposal embodies "implied encouragement of derivative actions," Andrews, supra note 23, at 38, simply misstates the effects and intent of the
proposal.
From the viewpoint of management and directors, the most serious objections to the
proposal are that § 7.03 seeks to contain the recent eruption of new law authorizing independent directors to terminate derivative suits, and opts for a change patterned after the
Delaware alternative, which is a less drastic departure from the historic common law. See
infra note 33 and accompanying text. The line of new decisions authorizing termination by
independent directors originated in suits against management for "questionable" overseas
payments, a context that confronted courts with the awkward question whether to allow
stockholders to hold management liable for seeking to enhance stockholder wealth or to
appear to condone the alleged misbehavior. See Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920
(1979). The utility of the termination device for managements charged with conflicts of interest was not lost upon managements' lawyers; and many courts have not distinguished the
contexts in which the derivative suit arose. See, e.g., Abramowitz v. Posner, 672 F.2d 1025
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that many directors, and more than occasional managements, do
not do less than their best, or indeed that their best is adequate.
And it certainly does not follow that either management or directors should enjoy special relief from the legal requirements that
the common law has traditionally imposed upon the role assigned
to them (and that they proclaim for themselves) as agents for the
stockholders as a group.
Professor Andrews simply aims at a wrong target when he
faults lawyers for focusing on downside returns resulting from
managerial negligence and not on upside returns from managerial
creativity. It is not within the power of the law or lawyers to produce either maximum positive performance by management or a
creative partnership between directors and management. Nor is it
the function of the law to legislate maximum managerial efficiency.
Possibly, to use Hurst's phrase on American corporate law during
the nineteenth and first third of the twentieth century, it could
operate to effect a "release of energy" 3 -albeit at the expense of
those a free market could victimize. But in the late twentieth-cen(2d Cir. 1982); Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145
(1982); Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980).
Prior to the expanded use of the termination device, it was possible, although not easy, for a
stockholder to enforce the substantive legal restrictions on managerial self-dealing or on
other culpable misconduct toward shareholders, at least if all of the directors were involved
in the misbehavior or condoned the misconduct. Even if only a majority of the directors
were involved, the derivative action in many contexts might survive the opposition of the
noninvolved directors. See Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An
Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 265 (1981); Dent,
The Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The Death of the Derivative
Suit?, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 96,102-04 (1980); Note, The Business Judgment Rule in Derivative

Suits Against Directors, 65

CORNELL

L.

REV.

600, 606-07 (1980).

The novelty in the strand of law that has been developing during the last several years
is that courts have ruled that if uninvolved and "independent" directors, generally appointed after the alleged misbehavior, seek dismissal of the action, their decision must be
respected as an exercise of business judgment. The general theme of the opinions is that if
the directors (1) are that disinterested, (2) use a reasonable method and effort in inquiring
into the alleged misbehavior, and (3) conclude that the interests of the corporation will be
served best by terminating the suit, then the suit must be dismissed because their business
judgment is unreviewable. See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994,
419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979). The Supreme Court of Delaware, for reasons it deems sufficient,
has retained a safety valve for stockholders. It insists that courts be empowered to take
some sort of look at, or to review, the judgment of the independent directors and the merits
of the charges. The Delaware requirements are not explicit or very clear, but they certainly
are modest. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). The New York alternative points to the effective elimination of stockholder derivative suits and erosion of the
mandates of substantive law that those suits were designed to enforce. See Joy v. North, 692
F.2d 880, 889 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983).
30. J.W. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY
UNrrED STATES 3-32 (1956); see also id. at 7.
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tury world of dispersed investors and people's capitalism, the legal
arrangements of our society also have a legitimating function.
Managerial power must be accountable to something. The American tradition requires accountability at least to stockholders. For
the most part the law purports to provide for such accountability
by prescribing minimal standards designed to forbid harmful conduct and discourage nonperformance by managers or directors. To
be sure, in doing so its mandate should not be so strict as to inhibit positive performance or achievement of efficient results. But
if current law does not embody such mandates, neither do the ALI
Reporters' proposals.
One implication of the proclaimed tension between the board's
creative and control functions is to weaken the board's monitoring
role so as effectively to erode its power to hold management accountable to stockholders." If the interest of obtaining productive
contributions from the board of directors requires substantially
eliminating minimum standards of care and personal liability for
the board, management is to be freed from the instrument that
traditionally is supposed to police the stockholders' agents. And to
the extent that management is relieved of the need to meet, or of
liability for failure to meet, such standards of care, management
will be held accountable to nothing but the market.
Attainment of that nirvana is also the apparent goal of those
critics who would effectively eliminate stockholders' suits against
those who violate standards of care. They oppose even the iron
lung that the ALI Reporters offer 2 in which to preserve the increasingly moribund derivative suit from the death sentence of the
New York courts. 8 And as a second line of defense, they seek to
31. Another implication is for the board to repose its creative function elsewhere. A
group of paid advisers or consultants could fulfill the creative function, while the board
keeps its overseeing and assessing function. Or, if the newly evolving creative function requires the superior status of board membership to maintain its effectiveness, a segmented
board may be fashioned-one part to be creative and the other to do the monitoring. The
history of large American business corporations reveals a remarkable capacity to adapt corporate form and internal governing apparatus to changes in markets, technology, and the
general economic environment. See A.

CHANDLER, STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE: CHAPTERS IN

THE HISTORY OF THE INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE (1962); A CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE
MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977). Presumably, new organizational

forms and changes in incentives for, or motivation of, management will occur as the environment in which the firm operates changes-leaving more (or less) room for the board to
function as both monitor and stimulus to management.

32. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 7.03 (procedures for terminating derivative
suit).
33. The ALI Reporters declined to accept the position of the New York Court of Appeals expressed in Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920
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dilute any serious consequences to directors and officers from assimilating the modest Delaware law on derivative suits. The suggestion is that the Reporters' proposal limiting the amount of personal liability to which officers and directors may be exposed for
negligent breach of the duty of care-4 does not go far enough-even
though that limitation will eliminate much of the initiative for
plaintiffs' lawyers in search of a fee.
As one critic has suggested, perhaps monetary sanctions on directors for violation of the duty of care are simply not feasible,
notwithstanding liberal indemnity and insurance protection." If
such sanctions are imposed, potential directors may be discouraged; and because if invoked they are so likely to overkill, they are
judicially nullified by relaxation of the strictures of substantive
law, so that violations are rarely found. It may be that nonmonetary sanctions are the most that can be imposed on outside directors for failing to police managerial competence or diligence. Other
sanctions can be envisioned, such as court-ordered removal and
publicity, or injunctions for fixed periods against further service as
a director of any publicly held corporation; but the effectiveness of
such sanctions is problematic, and, in any event, few are advocating them." Moreover, even if those modest sanctions would encourage serious policing efforts, they would leave directors subject
to the same practical limitations that currently paralyze their ability to fill adequately any kind of overseeing role in these matters.
For years it has been noted that outside directors are significantly handicapped in performing their asserted duty of overseeing
or keeping an eye on management's wealth-maximizing pursuit.
They have little time or inclination for such a task in view of their
origins and obligations to the other activities from which their livelihoods come. No less important, they have no staff.37 And even if
(1979). Instead, § 7.03 favors the position of Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del.
1981). See RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 7.03 comment a, at 304.
34. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 7.06(d)-(e).
35. Discussion of Restatement, supra note 16, at 545-47 (statement of William F. Kennedy); see also Conard, A Behavioral Analysis of Directors'Liability for Negligence, 1972

DUKE L.J. 895, 914.
36. See Coffee, "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick". An UnscandalizedInquiry into
the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386 (1981).
37. To enable outside directors to fulfill their functions, the ALI proposal authorizes

them to call upon corporate staff for information or, in special circumstances, to hire independent staff for assistance. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 3.04(a)-(b). Leaders of the
business community, see, e.g., The Business Roundtable, supra note 6, at 2103-04, and of
the bar, see, e.g., Corporate Director's Guidebook, supra note 7, at 1611, have urged that
outside directors have both powers. Those powers are to be distinguished from the more
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they had time and staff, serious questions exist as to whether using
them would result in counterproductive intrusion on managerial
discretion. Experience with the more active intrusion of directors
in many nonprofit enterprises suggests that such board activity
presents its own problems and may induce the executive to function less, rather than more, effectively. The dilemma posed by the
need to strike the balance between control and slack in fulfilling a
board's monitoring role productively has been a subject of debate
at least since Arthur Goldberg's epistle on leaving Trans World
Airlines in 1972.8 Thorny questions remain.
Indeed, there is good reason to believe that boards have
neither the power nor the disposition to displace inefficient management except in a crisis approaching the catastrophic.3 9 And except for that circumstance, boards in general are said to have been
unable to perform effective monitoring of managerial competence.40 To combine recognition of the practical limits on the
board's possible role as monitor with a disinclination to impose
standards for monitoring and sanctions for failure to meet those
standards raises the question whether some other kinds of control
mechanisms are needed.
It is not graven in stone that a corporation must have a board
of directors charged with overseeing management's efficiency or
diligence on behalf of investors. It is entirely conceivable for a legal
order to contemplate directors whose only role in such matters is
to serve as constructive partners or friendly and inspiring advisers
or even merely nominees of management. In such an order, the
board could be expected to allow management to be self-perpetuating, with the capital markets offering the only discipline. At least
one school of thought seeks no mechanism other than the market
to discipline management and apparently believes that directors
should function simply as instrumental aides to management in
such a system.4 ' And the Securities and Exchange Commission has
demanding suggestion (made by others) that outside directors have their own permanent
staff. See, e.g., Goldberg, Debate on Outside Directors, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1972, § 3, at 1,
col. 3. To seriously object to either of the powers that the ALI recommends, however, is
effectively to object to giving outside directors any obligatory overseeing functions.
38. See Goldberg, supra note 37, passim.
39. See M. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY (1971); Mace, Directors: Myths and

Reality-Ten Years Later, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 293 (1979).
40. See authorities cited supra note 39. Professor Andrews also acknowledges the limitations on the capacity of contemporary boards to perform monitoring functions. See Andrews, supra note 23, at 38-39. Recognition of those limitations no doubt accounts for the
porosity of current law in matters of directors' duty of care.
41. See, e.g., Hessan, The Modern Corporationand Private Property: A Reappraisal,
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recently raised the question whether to eliminate entirely the
board of directors of mutual funds,4 2 on grounds that some might
find broad enough to cover elimination of boards of all large corporate enterprises.
Notwithstanding the efforts of the academic free marketers

and their associates in the business community, there has not yet
been demonstration"' or acceptance of the proposition that the
markets alone provide an adequate mechanism for narrowing managerial discretion so as to press management to improve its efficiency, much less to press management to perform optimally for

the stockholders of their corporations. Indeed the proposition that
the markets alone are enough to discipline management has rarely
been urged by formal agencies of the business establishment in the

past. On the contrary, they have sought to convince the public that
the legitimacy of managerial power and necessary constraints on
its discretion derive from management's responsibility or accounta-

bility to stockholders (and possibly the public), and that directors
are the key instrument in enforcing or overseeing such responsibility. Independent directors to monitor management have been
urged as such a legitimating factor for a corporate system that during the past decade has revealed unsuspected depths of managerial
corruption and a breadth of managerial discretion that permits

much less than optimal performance. Opponents of the ALI Reporters' proposal appear reluctant to espouse explicitly alteration

of that theory, although the dilution of the legal norms that they
urge would go a long way to substitute the capital markets for
directors.

Apart from the impact such substitution would have on the
26 J.L. & ECON. 273 (1983).
42. See SEC Investment Co. Act Release No. 12,888, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 83,303 (Dec. 10, 1982).
43. On the contrary, even if markets are assumed to be efficient, the size of premiums
offered in leveraged buy-outs and straight going-private transactions suggests substantial
managerial slack and very ineffective policing of management's performance by the market.
The comparable size of the premiums offered in third party takeovers supports that suggestion. Doubtless some, and possibly all, of the increase in the size of the premiums since
enactment of the Williams Act, Pub. L. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 781-78n (1982)), and state anti-takeover legislation is attributable to the impediments generated by governmental intervention. But the notion that the market threat of
takeover induces significant improvement in managerial efficiency is not self-evident. The
lack of any demonstrated contraction of premiums over the last ten years in the takeover
movement raises questions about the salutary effect of takeovers in reducing slack. Doubts
about the notion that bidders have "better" managements than their targets are not allayed
by the recurrence of takeovers like U.S. Steel's acquisition of Marathon Oil and the Martin
Marietta, Bendix, Allied Corporation, United Technologies transactions.
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public's perception of the protection that boards of directors offer
to investors, there are other reasons for concern with its possible
consequences. Serious questions are being raised by sober people
about how effectively managements of large American corporations
perform their profit making functions-and about how adequate
the market is to induce proper performance by them."" The efficacy of the market as a disciplining force is not wholly evident
from the foreign loan policies of the managements of some American banks. The success of foreign competition in manufacturing
fields once dominated by American companies stimulates questions
about management's performance, and about who or what polices
management in the interests of stockholders. The pre-recession
solvency problems of some of our large manufacturers, retailers,
and airlines also raise such question. Currently popular are complaints about the costs of the alleged short-term perspectives that
limited stock market horizons and the limited term of managerial
tenure impose upon corporate executives. If those complaints have
any validity, the absence of internal monitoring with a longer time
horizon is significant. To be sure, recent history does not demonstrate that internal policing by outside directors, at least as heretofore chosen, offers a cure for those complaints or for any of the
others. But if not monitoring by outside directors, then by whom?
Government intervention-largely federal-on behalf of stockholders is the traditional response to institutional arrangements
that impair the market's ability to prevent insiders from overreaching in dealings with their corporation or its securities. It is
not necessary to advocate the extreme (or any) forms of such intervention45 in order to speculate about the possibilities. One scenario
that might replace the powerless board as the instrument for encouraging managerial compliance with minimum standards of efficiency would be a corps of government-appointed ombudsmen. Internal revenue agents were at one time assigned in teams for
periods of several years to review the federal income tax returns of
particular large corporations. They made their offices at corporate
44. Hayes & Abernathy, Managing Our Way to Economic Decline, HARV. Bus. REV.,
July-Aug. 1980, at 67.
45. One can, by a stretch of the imagination, envision substantive rules under which all
or part of management's compensation would be expanded or curtailed as performance
(over some period, by some margin or with acceptable explanations) meets or fails to meet
some fulcrum quantity. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 205, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5
(1976). The difficulties in defining such a system and making it operational are enough to
preclude consideration of such possibilities, unless no other effective accountability technique is acceptable.
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headquarters and, to the extent necessary for the job, poked
around in the entrails of the firm-examining the documents underlying claimed items of income and expense, comparing one
year's underpinnings with another's, and ending up with a report
on deficiencies or overpayments. To be sure, the operation, not to
mention the creation, of such a corps of monitors of managerial
performance would present stubborn if not intractable
problems-how to find or define a pool of persons qualified to
serve as such monitors; what incentives to offer them; what standards they should apply in determining management's minimal obligations to stockholders; how they should function in administering such standards as they divine; and what sanctions they should
be empowered to impose if they find managerial shortcomings.
If the idea of a corps of ombudsmen seems too paternalistic or
too costly, an adaptation of suggestions for a few government-appointed representatives on the board may be more palatable.4" It
has been suggested that independent directors be appointed by
government, or at least with the consent of a court or agency, in
response to actual or potential unlawful behavior by incumbent
management. And comparable appointments have been made on
occasion.47 Substantial as is such an intrusion on managerial and
investor autonomy, it has been suggested principally in the limited
circumstances of law violation or generic industry problems affecting the public. The notion is so confined presumably because it is
assumed that management is otherwise monitored by a board that
attends to its obligation with respect to minimal performance by
management. If those minimal obligations are further reduced, the
scope for government-appointed directors may be seen to be expanded to monitor more than compliance with law. Once again,
any such intrusion presents difficult problems of personnel, standards, incentives, staffing, operation, and remedies.
The ALI Reporters do not seek,4 8 and few of their critics urge,
46. Stone, Public Directors Merit a Try, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1976, at 20. For
development of the theme on a broader base and with further reach, see Weiss, Social Regulation of Business Activity: Reforming the Corporate Governance System to Resolve an
InstitutionalImpasse, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 343 (1981).
47. See Solomon, Restructuring The Board of Directors: Fond Hope-FaintPromise?,
76 MIH. L. REV. 581, 592 n.44 (1978); Comment, Court-Appointed Directors:Ancillary Relief in Federal Securities Law Enforcement Actions, 64 GEO. L.J. 737 (1976); Comment,
Equitable Remedies in SEC Enforcement Actions, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1188, 1210-14 (1975).
48. Professor John C. Coffee, Jr., one of the ALI Reporters, noted that the Reporters
are not proponents "of state regulation, or of close bureaucratic review of corporate transactions, or of broader enforcement powers being given to state agencies." Discussion of Restatement, supra note 16, at 531.
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such an arrangement or consider it preferable to a stockholderchosen board that is obliged to monitor and sanctioned for failure
to do so. But if the board is relieved of its monitoring role and its
obligations are diluted, the basic questions remain: How can the
legitimacy claimed for the allocation of power in the corporate
structure be established? What other mechanism of accountability
should be fashioned?
III.

OTHER DIRECTORIAL FUNCTIONS CHALLENGED BY THE CRITICS

OF THE ALI REPORTERS' PROPOSALS

The challenges to the ALI Reporters' proposals raise other
questions about the board's function. The Reporters' proposals address only one of the several functions claimed for boards of directors-overseeing management's performance in matters of enterprise efficiency.4 9 But some of the objections to the Reporters'
proposals rest on premises that affect more than that role and extend to another of the board's functions-policing management's
integrity.
The vast bulk of stockholder litigation against management
and directors originates in claims of conflict of interest. That is the
grist for the lawyers' mill. Stockholder challenges to management's
performance of its duties of care are rarely made. Such litigation as
has occurred over directors' obligations of care generally has focused on directors' failure to police management's conflicts of interest. The objections to the ALI Reporters' proposal to preserve
some small vestige of derivative suits,50 therefore, appear to be
aimed as much at the continued vitality of requirements of managerial integrity as at the duty of care.5
To be sure, eliminating the derivative suit does not necessarily
mean eliminating formal strictures on conflicts of interest or selfdealing. But if, as critics suggest, the director's sensitive relationship with management obstructs a meaningful monitoring role in
matters of efficiency, it presents an even larger obstacle to inter49. See

RESTATEMENT,

supra note 10, § 3.02.

50. The Reporters' proposal distinguishes between derivative suits alleging violation of
the duty of care and those charging violation of the duty of loyalty. But the developing case
law that the proposal would curb includes suits charging conflicts of interest and violations
of other loyalty obligations. Those criticizing the proposal as too drastic do not appear to
make the distinction.
51. It does not detract from this conclusion that the cost to society from managerial
shortcomings in matters of integrity may be modest compared to the damage resulting from
managerial failures in matters of efficiency or law compliance.
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preting and enforcing strictures against self-dealing by his managerial colleagues. And his function would all but disappear if derivative suits against him in this area were effectively eliminated. If
independent directors cannot validate managerial self-dealing behavior by effectively policing such transactions, and stockholders
cannot enforce legal requirements by derivative suit, then more intensive policing by government is invited-either externally by law
enforcement agencies or internally by appointed watchdogs, and in
either case by much more rigorous prohibitions of conflicts of in52
terest than now govern.
Finally, some critics of the ALI Reporters' proposals raise a
troublesome argument that is at odds with another widely proclaimed role of the board of directors. The Reporters' proposals are
appropriately modest in the standards they urge for corporate social responsibility." But the one component of social responsibility
that even opponents of that general concept acknowledge as a
proper concern is the need for corporations to comply with law.
And as has been observed elsewhere, whatever the limits of the
capacities of independent directors, the most significant role that
they can play is in the matter of encouraging corporate compliance
with law. 4
The ALI Reporters suggest explicitly that a corporation "is
obliged, to the same extent as a natural person, to act within the
boundaries set by law."5 5 The point of that stricture, which surely
adds nothing to the common law, is to negate the notion that a
corporation may properly fail to adhere to a given rule if a costbenefit analysis satisfies its management and directors that probable corporate gains outweigh either probable costs (measured by
dollar liability imposed for engaging in such conduct) or probable
52. In this connection it may be instructive to note the suggestion by representatives of
the British financial community for more extensive government intervention. That community, which currently appears to suffer from substantial incidents of fraud and scandal, operates within a jurisprudence that discourages private actions and relies principally on cum-

bersome government criminal sanctions. According to The Times of London, "Many in the
City believe its tattered image owes more to government failure to tackle fraud than to
inherent dishonesty among those who make their living there." The Times (London), Feb. 8,
1983, at 20, col. 2. The Council for the Securities Industry claims that "'the greatest weakness of the present system lies in what is a governmental responsibility-the failure to deal
effectively with commercial and financial frauds.'" Id.
53. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 2.01.
54. Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1979);
see also Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkim Village?, 95
HAv. L. REv. 597, 656 (1982).

55.

RESTATEMENT,

supra note 10, § 2.01(a).
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corporate losses (measured by potential liability discounted for
likelihood of detection).
Individuals, whether conducting their own businesses or otherwise, also may make such cost-benefit analyses. But individuals are
subject to two more powerful deterrents to unlawful behavior than
are large public corporations. Personal sanctions may be visited on
the individual; hence in calculating the costs, the individual has
more to fear than does the corporate officer or director. And more
important, the individual has values other than maximizing his
wealth and can freely trade off wealth maximization for the personal satisfaction of law compliance.
Corporate officers operate in a more complex equilibrium. In
theory, they are under pressure to maximize stockholder wealth
and have no obligations to satisfy, if indeed they could measure,
stockholders' utiles from law compliance. In practice, the institutional structure in which corporate officers function reinforces
their theoretical obligations to press for economic returns." Hence
there is much less scope for them to yield corporate profitability
for, and considerably more institutional pressure on them to
choose such profitability over, the personal satisfaction of conduct
that stops far short of the law's prohibitory line.
Moreover, the individual businessman is more likely in normal
course to know facts alerting him to problems of, and to be responsible for, illegality in the business than are the persons at the apex
of large and complicated corporate structures. The purpose of articulating the latters' obligation to be concerned with compliance is
to raise their consciousness level-an effort that is justified by the
size of the organization, the resulting impediments to assigning responsibility and to the upward flow of information,5" and the tilt of
institutional pressures on corporate actors.
56. Cf. J. Treadway, Speech to American Bar Association Securities Law Committee
(Mar. 2, 1983), summarized in 15 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 9, at 421 (Mar. 4, 1983)
(middle-level executives have been falsifying financial statements, because of pressure to
meet profit goals).
57. Organizational complexities and the impediments to both upward and downward
information flows permit illegal behavior for which it is often difficult to attribute individual
culpability. See M. ERMANN & R. LUNDMAN, CORPORATE AND GOVERNMENTAL DEVIANCE:
PROBLEMS OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2d ed. 1982); C. STONE,
WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OP CORPORATE BEHAVIOR (1975). For a discus-

sion of the problems of the upward flow of information to top decisionmakers, see R. CYERT
& J. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 109-10 (1963); E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS
AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS

122-24 (1975); Coffee, Beyond the

Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective
Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1137-38 (1977).
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In recognition of those differences, to mention nothing of the
history of wholesale corporate law violation revealed in the aftermath of Watergate, the ALI Reporters' proposal explicitly defines
the duties of officers and directors to include being "reasonably
concerned with the existence and effectiveness of. . . law compliance programs, 58 and making "reasonable efforts to cause [their]
corporation . . . to obey the law."'59 As the ALI report points out,
those provisions add little, if anything, of substance to directors'
obligations under prior law." Moreover, those so-called obligations
are little more than precatory, for the ALI proposal with respect to
derivative suits virtually precludes their enforcement by stockholders. Indeed, one ALI Reporter so indicated.' If, as has been suggested, the Securities and Exchange Commission should back away
from requiring disclosure in such matters under the securities
laws, 2 it is all the more necessary to stimulate internal concern
with effecting law compliance.
Yet several critics of the ALI Reporters' proposal have focused
on its articulation of the board's obligation to be concerned with
law compliance, and object to such a proposal. For the most part,
these critics are lawyers 6 -suffering from what can charitably be
called a neurotic fear of articulation. It is hard to understand the
basis for objecting to so mild a requirement. Perhaps, the Reporters' proposal calls attention to an unpleasant past and to equally
unpleasant possibilities in the future. Doubtless, most large corporations eschewed such possibilities. But, unfortunately, many did
not. How to induce compliance with law by any association or
group, including large business corporations, implicates some of
the more bedeviling problems that afflict our society today." To
suggest the mild nostrum of requiring the directors to pay some
attention to whether the corporation is in compliance with the law
is simply not enough to justify objections from lawyers.
58. RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 4.01(b).
59. Id. § 4.01(c).
60. See id. § 4.01 comment a, at 142-43.
61. See Discussion of Restatement, supra note 16, at 530-36 (statement of Professor
John C. Coffee, Jr.)
62. J. Fedders, Speech to the Federal Regulation of Securities Committee, ABA Section
of Corporation, Banking and Business Law (Nov. 19, 1982), reprinted in 14 SEC. REG. & L.
REP. (BNA) No. 46, at 2057, 2057-58 (Nov. 26, 1982).
63. At least one nonlawyer critic also appears to share this fear. See Andrews, supra
note 23, at 38.
64. See Coffee, supra note 36; Stone, Large Organizationsand the Law at the Pass:
Toward a General Theory of Compliance Strategy, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 861; Vaughan, Toward Understanding Unlawful OrganizationalBehavior, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1377 (1982).
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That it may provoke noisy objections from some executives
against lawyers who "'tell us how to run our business'

"65

is per-

haps understandable. But, it is not inappropriate in this context to
recall an admonition made almost half a century ago by then-Justice Harlan Stone speaking about managerial departures from the
fiduciary principle. His observations about a financial era then
drawing to a close are certainly not less applicable to corporate
failures to comply with legal prescriptions during the past decade
or so. He said:
[W]hen we know and face the facts we shall have to acknowledge that such departures from ... principle do not usually oc-

cur without the active assistance of some member of our profession, and that their increasing recurrence would have been
impossible but for the complaisance of a Bar, too absorbed in
the workaday care of private interests to take account of these
events of profound import or to sound the warning that the profession looks askance upon these, as things that "are not
done.""
Today, the language of the admonition seems quaint. But its substance is no less compelling now than it was then.

65. Lewin, supra note 9, at D6, col. 5.
66. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L.

REV.

1, 9 (1934).

